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INTER-COURT CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE AFTER THE ENLARGEMENT – 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR KÖBLER
Jan Komárek∗
Summary: This paper discusses the Köbler case, in which the Court of Justice confirmed that the  
principle  of  Member  States’  liability  for  breaches  of  Community  law  (the  “Francovich” 
Principle) also applies to breaches committed by national judiciaries. The author looks at this  
decision and, more importantly, at the Court’s reasoning from the point of view of the concept of  
multi-constitutionalism, which, he believes, is a viable model for a pluralistic entity such as the  
European Union. Several shortcomings of the decision are discussed in this paper, including the  
Court’s  avoidance of  difficult  questions by reference to the principle  of  national procedural  
autonomy, or its unpersuasive comparative reasoning. One further shortcoming is the lack of any  
balancing  argumentation,  which would  have seemed appropriate  in  a  case  where  two legal  
principles (the effectiveness of Community law, on the one hand, and legal certainty and res  
judicata, on the other) stood in opposition. In the final part of the paper, the author points out  
that the problem of gaining acceptance for this decision may be even more difficult with regard  
to judges in the new Member States, as their legal systems are simultaneously undergoing not  
only Europeanisation but also transition.
1 INTRODUCTION
On the doorstep of Enlargement,  the European Union is “in search of a public philosophy”.1 
Classical efforts to explain the complex constitutional coexistence between the Member States 
and the developing EU legal order have so far failed.2 The Enlargement highlights the need to 
find a new constitutional theory and practice for an even more diverse Union. New Member 
States will bring new issues, or at least new concerns, resulting from their different historical 
experiences (e.g. constitutional sensitivity due to their recently earned sovereignty and different 
views on the protection of fundamental rights).3 
 LL.M. Stockholm, 2004, Diploma of the AEL-EU Law Session, EUI Florence, 2004. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Czech Republic, Department of EC Law (Agency for the Czech Republic before the Court of Justice of the EC). 
Further comments are welcomed at jankomarek@centrum.cz. I would like to thank my colleagues Katinka Persson, 
Martin Mörk and James Brand for their corrections of the text and comments thereon. This paper was prepared for 
presentation at the international seminar within the framework of the Jean Monnet Module “Advanced Issues of 
European Law” held in IUC Dubrovnik, February 29 – March 7, 2004
1 For an outline see, inter alia, I. Ward, A Critical Introduction to European Law, London, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 
2003, p. 246-280 (Ch. 8 bearing this title) or in more details A. Verhoeven,  THE EUROPEAN UNION IN SEARCH OF A 
DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002.
2 See, generally, for example, J.H.H.Weiler, CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 
p. 221-237 (Introduction: The Reformation of European Constitutionalism), at p. 230-234.
3 See, for example, W. Sadurski, Constitutionalization of the EU and the Sovereignty Concerns of the New Accession  
States:  The  Role  of  the  Charter  of  Rights,  EUI  Working  Paper  Law  11/03,  www.iue.it/PUB/Law03-10.pdf 
(30.9.2003).  From  this  point  of  view,  the  Schmidberger  Case  –  C-112/00,  [2003]  ECR  I-5659  is  extremely 
important. Cf. case note by C. Brown, [2003] 40 CMLRev, 1499. For recent examples, see A. Sajo, Learning Co-
operative Constitutionalism the Hard Way: the Hungarian Constitutional Court Shying Away from EU Supremacy, 
Zeitschrift  für  Staats-  und  Europawissenschaften  (ZSE)  3/2004,  p.351-371  and  the  decision  of  the  Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal of April  27 2005 – P 1/05, invalidating national law implementing the European Arrest 
Warrant  –  see  the  press  release  available  at 
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Multi-constitutionalism seeks to be a response to this search for a public philosophy.4 It rejects 
the idea of hierarchy in the multiplicity of legal orders, which compose the legal order of the EU. 
This is also reflected in a positive way by Art. 6(3) EU or even more clearly by Art. I-5(1) of the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,5 which calls for respect of the Member States’ 
national constitutional identities. Debates concerning the meaning of Art. 10 EC also confirm the 
need for real co-operation,  as opposed to subordination of the national legal orders and their 
judiciaries to the “supreme legal order of the EU”.
Both the Court of Justice and national courts play an important role in the Integration Project,6 
and part of this “constitutional paradigm reform” must therefore also embrace views on the inter-
court dialogue.7 This “dialogue” means something more than merely the duty of national judges 
to adjust their respective legal orders to the tasks of integration. The word “dialogue” implies an 
exchange between parties that somehow respect each other. Therefore, in order for a real inter-
court dialogue to take place and be effective, one must also expect changes to be made at the EU 
level.7a
The recent case of Mr Köbler8 is in this context interesting for several reasons. In this case, the 
Court of Justice had to manoeuvre in a very sensitive area of law: the responsibility of a state for 
acts committed by its judicial bodies. Promoting the effectiveness of Community law at the time 
of Enlargement seems to be the main ratio behind the reasoning of the Court. However, even for 
proponents of Community law in national legal orders, the judgement remains unsatisfactory and 
deserves critique on the way the Court has reasoned. The purpose of this paper is to present the 
possible critique and put it into the context of the inter-court constitutional dialogue. 
In particular, the second part of the paper will present the facts of the case and the decision of the 
Court of Justice. Then, in the third part, some weaknesses in the reasoning will be demonstrated: 
the unresponsiveness to arguments of governments intervening in the case regarding different 
standards of liability for Community courts and their national counterparts,  the unconvincing 
comparative  reasoning  of  the  Court,  and  a  contradiction  in  the  judgement  in  dealing  with 
balancing arguments and the application of a “sufficiently-serious-breach test”. Lastly, the fourth 
part will show possible (or even necessary) responses from a national level. In particular, the fact 
that the highest courts at a national level9 should respect their duty resulting from Art. 234 EC to 
refer preliminary questions to the Court of Justice. They should also use the case-law of the Court 
as at least a persuasive authority or even a source of law when arguing on the national level. 
http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/EAW_release_27_04_05_new.pdf (2.5. 2005).
4 See, inter alia, N. Mac Cormick, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY, Oxford, OUP, 1999; F.C. Mayer and I. Pernice,  De la  
consitution composée de l'Europe, [2000] 35 RTD eur 623, N. Walker,  The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, EUI 
Working Paper Law 2002/01, http://www.iue.it/PUB/law02-1.pdf (23.10.2003).
5 OJ 2004 C 310.
6 See A.M. Slaughter, A.S. Sweet, J.H.H. Weiler (eds.),  THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS – DOCTRINE AND 
JURISPRUDENCE, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998 or see n.2 (Weiler 1999), p. 188-218 (“The Least Dangerous Branch: A 
Retrospective and Prospective of the European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration”).
7 F.C. Mayer, The European Constitution and the Courts - Adjudicating European constitutional law in a multilevel  
system.  The Jean  Monnet  Program Working Papers  9/03,  http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030901-
03.html (11.1. 2004), pp. 29-41.
7a See a deeper reflection of this topic J. Komárek,, Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System: Building 
Coherence in the Community Legal Order, [2005] 42 CMLRev. 9.
8 Case C-241/01 Gerhard Köbler v. Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-10239.
9 For an outline of these courts, see n. 7 (Mayer 2003), p. 3-4.
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2 THE KÖBLER CASE 
In 1996 Mr Köbler applied for a special length-of-service increment for university professors in 
Austria. He did so even though he had completed the requested 15 years’ period as a professor 
also in Member States other than Austria. The requirement of the relevant law was to complete 
the period at  Austrian universities only;  however,  he claimed that  such a requirement  led to 
indirect discrimination contrary to the Treaty, in particular to the Free Movement of Workers.10 
Nevertheless,  his  application was dismissed by the administrative  authorities  and his  dispute 
eventually  reached  the  Austrian  Supreme Court  (Verwaltungsgerichtshof).  This  court,  in  the 
course of the proceedings, then referred the question to the Court of Justice. The question was 
whether work of equal value performed in another Member State (such as that of Mr Köbler as a 
university professor outside Austria) must be taken into account in exactly the same way as such 
work performed in the Member State applying a salary scheme in which remuneration depends, 
inter alia, on length of service (i.e. in Austria).11 Since the same issue had been dealt with by the 
Court  of  Justice  in  Schöning-Kougebetopoulou,12 the  Registrar  of  the  Court  asked  the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof whether it deemed its reference necessary in the light of this judgement. 
The Verwaltungsgerichtshof subsequently informed the parties that the legal issue, which was the 
subject-matter of the question submitted for a preliminary ruling, seemed to be resolved in favour 
of the applicant, Mr Köbler, and withdrew its referral. However, the story did not have a happy 
ending. The Verwaltungsgerichtshof changed its view on the contested increment and held that it 
was in fact a special bonus for loyalty (and not a bonus for length of service). According to the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof’s interpretation  of  the  Schöning-Kougebetopoulou  judgement,  the 
requirement to complete the whole 15-year period as a university professor only in Austria was 
justified. Without referring any further question to the Court of Justice, it finally dismissed Mr 
Köbler’s claim for obtaining the increment.
The  Köbler Case could very well have ended there, since at that time no Community remedy 
against a decision of a national court, which disregarded its obligations from the Treaty, seemed 
to exist.13,14 The cases where national courts infringed the Treaty were sometimes found in annual 
reports  of  the  Commission  on  monitoring  the  application  of  the  Community  law,  but  the 
Commission had never brought a Member State to the Court in an infringement procedure.15
The Brasserie de Pêcheur/Factortame III judgement16 indicated a possible change in that regard:
10 Article 39 EC and Article 7(1) of Council Reg. 1612/68 [1968] OJ L 257/2 of 15 October 1968 on the freedom of 
movement for workers within the Community.
11 Cf. Case C- 382/97 Gerhard Köbler v. Bundesminister für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kunst [1998] OJ C 7/9.
12 Case C-15/96 Schöning-Kougebetopoulou [1998] ECR I-47.
13 The French Conseil d’Etat  is perhaps most “famous” in that matter when, for example, it denied the directives’ 
direct effect in the case Cohn-Bendit. Cf. case note by P.J.G. Kapteyn, [1979] 16 CMLRev. 701 or A. Oppenheimer, 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW: THE CASES , Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1994, p. 316-334 where the text of the decision may be found.
14 Cf.,  inter alia, H.G. Schermers and D.F. Waelbroeck,  JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 6th Ed., The 
Hague/London/New York, Kluwer Law International, 2001; or K. Lenaerts, D. Arts and R. Bray (eds.), PROCEDURAL 
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, London, Sweet&Maxwell, 1999, p. 53. Both of them were still indicating the possibility 
to claim damages from a Member State.
15 This has also changed: cf. Case C-129/00  Commission v. Italy  [2003], 9.12. 2003, not yet reported. See n. 7a 
(Komárek 2005) and a case comment D. Simon,  La condamnation indirecte du ‘manquement judiciaire’: Le juge 
national doit être asservi par le legislateur au respect du droit communautaire. Europe, vol. 14, No. 3/2004, p. 8
16 Joined Cases C-46 and 48/93 Brasserie de Pêcheur/ Factortame III [1996] ECR I-1029.
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[The principle of State liability] holds good for any case in which a Member State breaches Community 
law,  whatever  be  the  organ  of  the  State  whose  act  or  omission  was  responsible  for  the  breach.  In 
addition, in view of the fundamental requirement of the Community legal order that Community law be 
uniformly  applied  [...]  the  obligation  to  make  good  damage  caused  to  individuals  by  breaches  of 
Community law cannot depend on domestic rules as to the division of powers between constitutional 
authorities. [...I]n international law a State whose liability for breach of an international commitment is 
in issue will be viewed as a single entity, irrespective of whether the breach which gave rise to the 
damage is attributable to the legislature, the judiciary or the executive. This must apply a fortiori in the 
Community legal order [...].17
The  fact  also  that  courts’  decisions  may invoke  Member  States’  liability  was  mentioned  by 
Advocate  General  Léger  in  Hedley  Lomas18 and  discussed  by  scholars.19 However,  opinions 
contesting such a possibility still existed.20
Mr Köbler was the first to turn the debate into reality and claimed damages against Austria in the 
Regional Civil Court  (Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien). He claimed reparation of the 
loss which he had allegedly suffered as a result of the non-payment to him of a special length-of-
service increment. He maintained that the judgement of the  Verwaltungsgerichtshof infringed 
directly applicable provisions of Community law, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in the 
judgements  in  which  it  held  that  a  special  length-of-service  increment  does  not  constitute  a 
loyalty bonus. 
Hearing the case of liability claim, the Landesgericht then referred to the Court of Justice several 
questions which may be summarised as follows: the possibility of a Member State to be held 
responsible for an act of its supreme court (question of principle); the conditions of such liability 
(question of conditions); and then the case of Mr Köbler itself (question of application). The last 
of the questions referred to shows the conundrum of judicial responsibility for national judicial 
systems. Such responsibility leads to a situation where judges are forced to judge other judges. 
And paradoxically, it is possible that the claim for damages may end in the same court which 
gave the judgement breaching Community law. No wonder the Landesgericht invited the Court 
of Justice into the realm of “national procedural autonomy”, leaving the ruling on the substantive 
part of Mr Köbler’s claim for this Court.
The decision of the Court of Justice confirmed the opinions affirming the possibility of such 
liability and stated that a Member State must make good the damage even if caused by a breach 
of Community law committed by a supreme court. It then more or less applied the conditions of 
the Brasserie de Pêcheur/Factortame III test. Unfortunately for Mr Köbler, it then found that the 
breach in question was not “sufficiently serious”. 
17 Ibid., paras. 32-34.
18 Opinion of Léger  AG in Case C-5/94  R. v.  Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries&Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas  
[1996] ECR I-2553, para. 114.
19 H. Toner, Thinking the Unthinkable? State Liability for Judicial Acts after Factortame (III), [1997] 17 YBEL 165, 
G. Anagnostaras,  The Principle of State Liability for Judicial Breaches: The Impact of European Community Law 
[2001] 7 EPL 281 are the most detailed analyses published in English.
20 For example, J. Steiner, Limits of State Liability for Breach of EU Law. [1998] 4 EPL 69, p. 91-92.
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3 QUESTIONS POSED BY THE JUDGEMENT
Though the judgement dealt directly with the question of judicial breaches of Community law, it 
left many points open. Let us now analyse the reasoning of the Court of Justice, focusing on its 
obscurities which should be further discussed and possibly clarified by the Court’s further case-
law. We will focus on three of them: the different standards for liability of the Member States and 
the Community by which intervening governments counter-argued against the liability; secondly, 
the Court’s rather unconvincing comparative legal reasoning; and finally, the contradictions in 
the Court’s reasoning in applying  the test  of a  sufficiently  serious breach to the case of Mr 
Köbler.
3.1 Conditions of liability – still the same for Member States as for the Community?
As mentioned above, a dispute for damages may reach by appeals the Supreme Court, which is 
responsible for the decision in question. Of course, in the Court of Justice’s view the resolution of 
this problem is clear: it is for Member States to designate the competent courts and lay down the 
detailed  procedural  rules  for  legal  proceedings  intended  to  fully  safeguard  the  rights  which 
individuals derive from Community law.21
However, the same problem may well arise before the Court of Justice itself: what if the Court of 
Justice breached Community law by its own decision? In  Bergaderm the Court confirmed that 
“the conditions, under which the State may incur liability, cannot, in the absence of particular  
justification, differ from those governing the liability of the Community in like circumstances”.22 
The  Governments  of  Austria  and the  United  Kingdom argued  that  holding  a  Member  State 
responsible  for  a  judicial  act  does  not  have  its  mirror  possibility  in  the  case  of  breaches 
committed by the Court of Justice, for the simple reason that there is no court in which one may 
raise such a claim.
Advocate General Léger has resolved the problem too simply: the liability in this case is excluded 
because the Court of Justice acts as the Supreme Court  of the Community and its  decisions 
cannot be reviewed by another court or tribunal!23 How can Member States accept this reasoning 
when the  Court  wants  them to find  how to  make possible  liability  claims  against  their  own 
supreme courts?
The Advocate General’s statement that “we cannot infer that the rules governing Member State  
liability  and  the  rules  in  respect  of  the  Community  must  develop  in  strict  parallel”24 is 
particularly  interesting  since  the  Court  has  established  the  whole  doctrine  of  Member  State 
liability on this parallel with liability of the Community (the only one mentioned expressly in the 
21 Köbler, see n. 8, para. 46.
22 Case  C-352/98  Laboratoires pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA and Jean-Jacques Goupil v. Commission [2000] 
ECR I-5291, para. 41. See also Brasserie de Pêcherur/FactortameIII, (see n. 16), para. 42.
23 Opinion of Léger AG in Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v. Republik Österreich [2003], 8.4. 2003, not yet reported, 
para. 94. He only admits such possibility in the case of the CFI – para. 93 of the Opinion, where he refers to Case C-
185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, and Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, 
C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v  Commission 
[2002] ECR I-8375.
24 Opinion, see n. 23, para. 94.
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Treaty).25 The Court has been criticised in the past 26 for applying different standards, and the 
conclusion of the Advocate General only confirms the tenability of this critique. 
3.2 Comparative legal reasoning of the Court of Justice
Academic opinion from Judge K. Lenaerts observes that only in a few cases has the Court of 
Justice referred expressly to comparative law.27 T. Möllers remarks that  “[proper comparative  
arguments] could enhance the acceptance of European law and also provide a role-model for 
national courts”.28
The  Court  relied  on  a  comparative  analysis  made  by  Advocate  General  and  found  that 
“application of the principle of State liability to judicial decisions has been accepted in one form  
or another by most of the Member States”.29 However, as will be shown further, this analysis is 
far from convincing and hardly enhances the acceptance of the judgement in national courts.
The Advocate General starts with the contention that all the Member States accept the principle 
of state liability for judicial acts, and then adds that all accept this principle, except Ireland. And 
then more “exceptions” keep coming. In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, responsibility 
is  possible  only in cases  of  infringement  of  the rules laid down in Article  5  (deprivation of 
liberty) or Article 6 of the ECHR30 (relating to the guarantees of a fair hearing). It then follows 
that “[a]ll the other Member States - excluding the Hellenic, Portuguese and French Republics,  
where  the  situation  is  evolving  and  more  nuanced  -  accept  the  principle  of  State  liability  
irrespective of the nature of the legal rule infringed.”31 Finally, Austria and Sweden limit state 
liability to the decisions of ordinary courts, excluding those of their supreme courts.
Seeing these “exceptions”, one may equally conclude that the principle of state liability is limited 
in its scope or excluded in its entirety, and it cannot be unequivocally stated that “the principle of  
State liability  -  for a judgement of  a supreme court in  breach of a legal rule -  is  generally  
acknowledged by the Member States,  or  at least  a  strong tendency in that  direction can be  
detected”.32
It may well be counter argued that the solution depends on a level of generalisation which one 
accepts  when  making  conclusions  from  the  different  national  approaches  mentioned  above. 
However, the crucial factor for making the damages claim possible may be found in the nature 
and seriousness of the breach (as in the case of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) or, to 
which court the breach can be attributed (e.g. exclusion of supreme courts). It may be deduced 
even from the Advocate General’s analysis that liability for any kinds of breaches committed by 
all levels of courts (including supreme courts) is known only to six Member States. Regrettably, 
when reading the Opinion, there are no references to the sources on which the Advocate General 
25 Cf. Brasserie de Pêcherur/FactortameIII, see n. 16, para. 42. See also K. Lenaerts,  Interlocking Legal Orders in 
the European Union and Comparative Law [2003] 52 ICLQ 873,  p. 887-893.
26 See T. Tridimas,.Liability for Breach of Community Law: Growing Up and Mellowing Down?, [2001] 38 CMLRev 
301, p. 321 and references therein.
27 See n. 25 (Lenaerts 2003), p. 874.
28 M.J. Möllers, The Role of Law in European Integration. [2000] 48 Am. J Comp. L, 679, p. 698.
29 Köbler, see n. 8, para. 48. The relevant part of the Opinion is paras. 77 to 82.
30 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, Council of Europe, Rome 4.11. 1950.
31 Opinion, see n. 23, para. 80. Emphasis added.
32 Ibid., para. 82.
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established  his  analysis.  Hence,  we  do  not  know how deep  the  analysis  was  –  whether  he 
compared only the legal texts or whether he took into account the “law in action” and saw how 
liability  is  actually applied.  Then it  is  questionable whether  this comparative analysis  indeed 
leads to “a right balance between the interests of Community law and the acceptability of [the]  
ruling to the national legal orders”,33 which, according to K. Lenaerts, is a function of the use of 
the comparative method.
3.3 (Non-) use of the balancing argumentation
One of the strongest counterarguments against the responsibility of a State for judicial acts has 
been the principle of  res judicata.34 From one possible point of view, the claim for damages 
repeats  the  original  dispute  with  a  changed  legal  basis,  but  with  an  identical  merit.  The 
unsatisfied party to the original dispute “appeals” this original decision by claiming the damages 
which this decision allegedly caused. The court hearing the damages claim must at the same time 
review the original decision. Thus, the liability for judicial breaches of Community law may go 
against the principle of the legal certainty and finality of the disputes.
Nevertheless, when deciding whether liability for judicial acts is possible in Community law, the 
Court of Justice completely excluded such a conflict. It stated that 
[P]roceedings seeking to render the State liable do not have the same purpose and do not necessarily 
involve the same parties as the proceedings resulting in the decision which has acquired the status of res  
judicata. The applicant in an action to establish the liability of the State will, if successful, secure an 
order against it for reparation of the damage incurred but not necessarily a declaration invalidating the 
status of  res judicata of the judicial decision which was responsible for the damage. In any event, the 
principle  of  State  liability  inherent  in  the  Community  legal  order  requires  such  reparation,  but  not 
revision of the judicial decision which was responsible for the damage.35
It is obvious that the Court of Justice interpreted the principle of res judicata in a strict formal 
manner. Of course, the parties are not identical – an unsatisfied party is seeking damages against 
the State, not the party to the original dispute. Also, the subject matter of this second dispute is 
different – now being the claim for damages. It is also true that the court deciding on the damages 
does not necessarily have to declare the original decision invalid. Nevertheless, when reviewing 
the  correctness  of  this  decision,  the  court  hearing  the  claim  for  damages  undermines  the 
legitimacy of the original decision as well as the legal certainty of the party which was satisfied 
in the original dispute. 
Even more striking, further along in the judgement, where the question of the conditions of such 
liability is dealt with, the Court of Justice states:
[...] regard must be had to the specific nature of the judicial function and to the legitimate requirements 
of  legal  certainty  [sic!],  as  the Member States  which  submitted observations  in  this  case  have also 
contended.  State  liability  for  an  infringement  of  Community law by a  decision  of  a  national  court 
33 See n. 25 (Lenaerts 2003), p. 883.
34 All intervening parties, together with Austria and the Commission, referred to this principle. This principle is also 
discussed by both authors mentioned above who dealt with judicial responsibility before the Köbler Case – see n. 19, 
(Toner 1997), p. 176; (Anagnostaras 2001), p. 289, in particular the latter.
35 Köblersee n.  8, para. 39. See also Opinion (n.23), para. 101.
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adjudicating at last instance can be incurred only in the exceptional case where the court has manifestly 
infringed the applicable law.
Contrary to its previous view, here the Court is aware of the conflict of the principles to make 
good any damage (or,  l’effet  utile of  Community  law)  and of  the  legal  certainty  (and more 
particularly,  though  not  expressly  stated  res  judicata)  and  limits  the  liability  only  to  “the 
exceptional  case where the court  has manifestly  infringed the applicable law”.  However,  the 
rationality  of  such  reasoning  is  contestable.  The  Court  should  have  submitted  balancing 
argumentation weighing the conflict of the principles.
In describing the balancing argumentation, R. Alexy states that “the greater the degree of non-
satisfaction of, or detriment to, one right or principle, the greater must be the importance of  
satisfying the other”.36 When a court uses balancing, it must firstly establish the degree of non-
satisfaction of, or detriment to, the first principle (in our case it would be the principle of legal 
certainty).  Next comes defining the importance of the satisfaction of the competing principle 
(legal protection of individuals or  l’effet utile). Finally, the court may arrive at the conclusion, 
giving reasons for favouring one of the principles. 
In the  Köbler Case,  the Court of Justice first excluded any possible conflict (even though in 
another part of the judgement it admits that such a conflict exists). Then the Court merely stated 
that there is another interest which must be taken into account when establishing the seriousness 
of the breach, without balancing the competing interests. 
3.4 (Mis)application of the “sufficiently serious breach” test
The condition of a “sufficiently serious breach” proved to be crucial for the outcome of the Court 
of Justice’s ruling in the Köbler Case. By ruling that the breach did not satisfy this strict test, the 
Court  excluded Austria’s  liability  and set  aside  interesting questions  regarding,  for  example, 
causality of the damage.37
According to the Court  of Justice,  three conditions must  be fulfilled conjunctively to hold a 
Member State liable for a breach of Community law: the rule of law infringed must be intended 
to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct 
causal link between the breach of the obligation incumbent on the State and the loss or damage 
sustained by the injured parties.38 
Specifying the second of these conditions (seriousness of the breach), the Court of Justice holds 
that certain factors which characterise the situation put before a national court shall be taken into 
account.  “They include in particular, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule infringed, 
whether the infringement was intentional, whether the error of law was excusable or inexcusable,  
the position taken, where applicable, by a Community institution and non-compliance by the 
court in question with its obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under the third 
paragraph of Article 234 EC.”39
36 R. Alexy,. On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison. [2003] 16 Ratio Juris 433, p. 436.
37 Cf. G. Anagnostaras,  The Allocation of Responsibility in State Liability Actions for Breach of Community Law: a  
Modern Gordian Knot? [2001] 26 ELRev. 139,  p. 142 et seq.
38 Köbler, see n. 8, para. 51.
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However,  when  adjudicating  whether  a  breach  had  been  committed  by  the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof, the Court disregarded the standard it had set above. It merely stated that 
the  Verwaltungsgerichtshof had breached Art. 234 EC on the preliminary ruling procedure as 
interpreted in the CILFIT40 and the Treaty provisions on the Free Movement of Workers.41 When 
coming to the conclusion that the breach committed was not sufficiently serious, it did not refer 
to  any  of  the  above-mentioned  factors.  Instead,  it  stated  that  “it  was  owing  to  its  [the  
Verwaltungsgerichtshof’s]  incorrect reading of that judgement that the Verwaltungsgerichtshof  
no longer considered it necessary to refer that question of interpretation to the Court”.42
In conclusion,  every national court  is  by this interpretation excused in the case where it  has 
“incorrectly read” the judgements of the Court of Justice. Whether (and in which way) the test for 
sufficiently serious breach is even applicable remains questionable and we must wait for another 
judgement of the Court on the matter.43
4 REFLECTIONS FROM THE OTHER SIDE
In  criticising  the  judgement,  the  author  does  not  contest  its  necessity  or  benefit  for  the 
Community. If we accept that national courts are the key actors in promoting Community law on 
the national level, we must also welcome the judgement as another tool for controlling the way 
they fulfil their obligations stemming from the Treaty. This applies even more at the time of the 
Enlargement, and this may be seen as one of the rationales behind the decision.44 
This explanation is supported by the fact that, at the time the judgement in the Köbler Case was 
given, the Court of Justice was dealing with an infringement case where Italy was being taken to 
the Court for, inter alia, the persisting practice of its courts in breaching Community law.45 For a 
long  time this  had  been  allegedly  excluded  by  the  argument  that  the  co-operation  and  trust 
between the Court of Justice and national courts would have been disrupted.46 We may see this 
infringement  procedure  as  a  warning  to  national  courts  in  the  New Member  States  to  take 
Community law seriously. 
The critique in this paper is directed towards the way the Court of Justice has reasoned in its 
judgement  in  the  Köbler  Case. From the  Enlargement  perspective,  the  need to  establish  the 
39 Köbler, see n. 8, para. 55. In the next paragraph of the judgement, the Court adds: “In any event, an infringement 
of Community law will be sufficiently serious where the decision concerned was made in manifest breach of the 
case-law of the Court in the matter [...]”. See the discussion further in part 4.2.
40 Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3430. As regards the obligation to refer the preliminary question to the Court of 
Justice, cf. see n.14 (Lenaerts, Arts, Bray 1999), p. 45-55 or (Schermers, Waelbroeck 2001),p. 266-285.
41 Köbler, see n. 8, paras. 118, 119.
42 Ibid., para. 123, emphases added.
43 Case C-173/03  Fallimento ‘Traghetti del Mediterraneo’ SPA v. Italian Republic, [2003] OJ C 158/10, is now 
pending in the Court.
44 Cf.  the reflection on that  in  Czech:  M. Bobek, Odpovědnost  členského státu  za akty moci  soudní;  příspěvek 
Evropského  soudního  dvora  k rozšíření  Evropské  unie? [Member  States’  Liability  for  Judicial  Breaches  of  
Community Law – A Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the Enlargement?] Časopis pro právní vědu a 
praxi 4/2003, p. 191-205. Another possible explanation may be also the reform of EC competition law implemented 
by Council Reg. 1/2003 [2003] OJ L 1/1 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, shifting the enforcement to the national level and allowing national 
courts direct application of Art. 81 EC.
45 Case C-129/00 Commission v. Italy [2003] 9.12. 2003, not yet reported.
46 Cf. see n. 14 (Schermers, Waelbroeck 2001), p. 630-631.
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Court’s legitimacy and to foster respect for its case-law in the new Member States and their 
courts is of vital importance, in particular for the proper integration of Community law and its 
values.
In these States,  the Court of Justice (or its  judgements) might  face different  kinds of judges 
sitting in ordinary courts than it  is used to from the current  15 Member States.  As Z. Kühn 
remarks:
The problematic curricula of the post-communist judiciary discourage many legal experts. The soon to 
be  European  judges  come  from authoritarian  and  totalitarian  traditions;  they  were  trained  under  a 
centrally planned economy; and last but not least, many of them received legal education which might be 
considered rather problematic from the Western view.47
The problematic relationship between the New Member States’ constitutional courts and ordinary 
courts foreshadows possible problems in their prospective relation to the Court of Justice. Z. 
Kühn observes the friction between these two branches and finds an explanation for this in the 
different ideologies of adjudication. In the case of the latter branch, constitutional courts followed 
the evolution of the Western world,  abandoning the strict  textual positivism and ideology of 
bound  decision-making.  Their  reasoning  is  more  value  oriented,  using  open  methods  of 
interpretation.48 In contrast, ordinary courts are still “enslaved” in the past approaches to “limited 
law”.49 The  Czech  Constitutional  Court  forces  ordinary  courts  towards  these  changes  and 
emphasises that they are not
[a]bsolutely bound by the literal wording of a legal provision, and they can and must deviate from it if 
such a  deviation  is  demanded by serious  reasons of  the  law’s  purpose,  the  history  of  its  adoption, 
systematic reasons or any principle deriving from the constitutionally conform legal order … In doing 
so,  it  is  necessary  to  avoid  arbitrariness;  the  decision  of  the  court  must  be  based  on  a  rational 
argumentation.50
This Constitutional Court’s approach then led to controversies between it and ordinary courts, 
and gave rise to reflections in the doctrinal debate.51 
The Court of Justice works in a very similar way, using teleological, comparative or contextual 
methods,52 which are still considered to be above-standard by the prevailing part of the Czech 
47 Z.  Kühn, Worlds  Apart.  Western  and  Central  European  Judicial  Culture  at  the  Onset  of  the  European  
Enlargement, to be published in [2005] Am. J Comp.L, on file with the author.
48 The collection of essays of one of the prominent judges of the Czech Constitutional Court serves as an excellent 
example: P. Holländer, ÚSTAVNĚPRÁVNÍ ARGUMENTACE [CONSTITUTIONAL REASONING], Prague, Linde, 2003. It seems to the 
author that  the disputes  regarding the difference between interpretation and reasoning in  constitutional  law and 
ordinary law reflect the same evolution as in, for example, Germany in the first ten years of the functioning of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in the beginning of the 1960s.
49 D. Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility. [1984] 72 Cal. Law R., 178 as cited in n. 47 (Kühn 2004). For 
a current outline of some remaining problems of “the justice in transition”, see W. Sadurski,. “Decommunisation",  
"Lustration",  and Constitutional Continuity: Dilemmas of  Transitional  Justice in Central  Europe,  EUI Working 
Paper Law, 2003/15, http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-15.pdf (14.1. 2004).
50 ÚS vol. 7, p. 87, the decision Pl. ÚS 21/96 as cited in n. 47 (Kühn 2004).
51 Cf. further, when the Czech Supreme Court refused to follow the Constitutional Court’s decision regarding the 
principle Ne bis in idem. We discuss the topic when dealing with the effect of Court of Justice’s case-law in the new 
Member States. See infra p. 17-18.
52 A.A. LLorens, The European Court of Justice, More than a Teleological Cour, [1999] 2 CYELS, 373.
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doctrine and, as such,  are taught at  law faculties.53 These methods will  not be in every case 
understood and accepted on the national level by ordinary judges. When the Court reasons in 
cases like Köbler, it should be borne in mind that the more persuasive it is, the better it would be 
accepted.
Let us now continue with reflections of the Köbler judgement on the national level, again with 
particular  focus  on  the  new  Member  States.  Firstly,  we  will  deal  with  the  national  courts’ 
obligation to refer preliminary questions to the Court of Justice. Then, we will discuss in brief the 
emergence of the “European precedent”, i.e. the effects of the Court’s case-law as a source of 
persuasive authority or even a source of law, and also its effect on the hierarchisation of the 
European judiciary.
4.1 Preliminary references – CILFIT revival
In Köbler, the Court of Justice found that, since the Verwaltungsgerichtshof did not maintain its 
request for a preliminary ruling, it breached the obligation it had according to Art. 234 EC. This 
provision states that a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no remedy under national 
law, when dealing with certain questions of interpretation of Community law, is obliged to refer 
such questions to the Court. 54 The Court has widened this obligation to all courts in cases where 
the validity of a Community act is in question.55 
For  the  highest  courts,  the  obligation  was  interpreted  by  the  Court  of  Justice  in  CILFIT.56 
According to the Court, a national judge does not have to refer the question when the question of 
Community law raised in proceedings before him is irrelevant  for  his  decision,  or  when the 
Community provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court, or finally when the 
correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable 
doubt.57 
The last one of the conditions, known as acte clair, is the most controversial. When relying on it, 
the national judge has to bear in mind that Community legislation is drafted in several languages, 
all  being  equally  authentic.  An  interpretation  thus  involves  a  comparison  of  the  different 
language versions. Furthermore, Community law uses terminology which is peculiar to it, and its 
legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in Community law as in the law of the 
various Member States. Finally, every provision of Community law must be placed in its context 
and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard being given to 
the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is 
to  be  applied.58 No  wonder  that  some  commentators  viewed  these  conditions  as  being 
unachievable.59
Nevertheless, the real effect of the CILFIT test – its actual application by highest national courts - 
is  contestable.  For  example,  the  Conseil  d’Etat relied  on  the  acte  clair  doctrine  between  1 
53 A. Gerloch,  TEORIE PRÁVA [A THEORY OF LAW], Dobrá Voda, A.Čeněk, 2001,p. 128-129.
54 See Art. 234 EC.
55 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199.
56 See n. 37.
57 CILFIT, see n. 40, para. 21.
58 Ibid., paras. 18-20.
59 For example, H. Rasmussen, The European Court’s Acte Clair Strategy in C.I.L.F.I.T,. [1984] 9 ELRev 242.
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January 197860 to 30 September 2001 in 191 cases.61 Even more striking is the disregard of the 
CILFIT  test  by the German Constitutional  Court  -  Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) when 
protecting the constitutional right to a lawful judge.62 The refusal of ordinary courts to refer a 
question of Community law to the Court of Justice may in some instances constitute a breach of 
this right. This occurs when an ordinary court arbitrarily (auf Wilkür beruhend) does not make 
a reference to the Court of Justice. The conditions of this arbitrariness are further specified by the 
BVerfG in  another judgement.63 What is  interesting is  that  these conditions were formulated 
differently from the  CILFIT  test  set  by the Court of Justice.  According to the BVerfG these 
conditions of arbitrariness are as follows: fundamental breach of the obligation to refer – the 
court  in  question  was  in  doubts  when  interpreting  Community  law;  the  court  intentionally 
diverged from the settled interpretation of the question by the Court; finally, there is no case-law 
of the Court, or this case-law does not fully cover the matter in its entirety.
However,  if  one  looks  at  the  well-known  Maastricht-Urteil,64 when  dealing  with  the 
interpretation of the Treaty (although formally interpreting the German Basic Law), the BVerfG 
referred  no  question  to  the  Court  of  Justice.  It  instead  heard  the  Director  General  of  the 
Commission Legal Service. It may well be considered to be in breach of Community law.65 The 
position of the BVerfG in the competences debate (Member States vs. the EU) is an explanation. 
The BVerfG would turn to the latter with a preliminary question only so as to send “its last 
warning” before it exercises its alleged ultimate Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The former Judge of the 
BVerfG, D. Grimm, even recommends German lower courts not to refer questions of competence 
to the Court of Justice, but rather to refer them to the BVerfG in order to allow the latter to 
express its strong warning itself.66
The Köbler Case was an excellent opportunity for the Court of Justice to reconsider the CILFIT 
test, which, if one is realistic, can hardly be fulfilled. It is even more unachievable for judges in 
the post-communistic countries. They are faced with “post-modern deconstruction” of their legal 
orders,67 when the “legislative whirlwind” brings newer and newer laws they have to know and 
apply. It is not only due to the transition, but also because these countries had to implement an 
immense  bulk  of  acquis  communautaire to  fulfil  conditions  for  membership  in  the  EU.  P. 
Holländer mentions the Czech Code of Civil Procedure, which had been substantially re-codified 
towards  1  January  2001.  However,  the  amendments  to  this  principal  re-codification  were 
considered  in  spring  of  the  same  year  and  by  summer  2002  it  had  been  (also  by  indirect 
60 Thus it applied the doctrine before it was established by the Court of Justice.
61 Cf. Preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Communities. General Report (18th Colloquium 
of Associations of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union, Helsinki, 
20.-21.5. 2002), http://193.191.217.21/colloquia/2002/gen_report_en.pdf (29.11. 2003), p. 29.
62 Solange II, BVerfGE 73, 339, [1987] 3 CMLR 225 or Kloppenburg-Beschluss,BVerfGE 75, 223 [1988] 3 CMLR 
1.
63 Absatzfonds, BVerfGE 82, 159.
64 Maastricht,  BVerfGE 89, 155. Available in English in A. Oppenheimer, The Relationship between European 
Community Law and National Law: the Cases. Volume I. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.526-575.
65 See n. 7 (Mayer 2003), p. 7.
66 D. Grimm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective after the  
Maastricht Decision, [1997] 3 Col. ELJ, 229, p. 241.
67 Cf.  n.  48 (Holländer  2003), p.  11-23. The essay symptomatically entitled  “The Judge today:  a barrier  to  a  
postmodern deconstruction or an industrial factory for decision-making?” has also been published in English: J. 
Priban, P. Roberts and J. Young (eds.), SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE IN TRANSITION: CENTRAL EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES SINCE 1989.  
Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2003,p. 77-93.
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amendments)  amended  18  times.68 The  judges  are  then  in  his  view “industrial  factories  for 
decision-making” rather then rationally ruling bodies.
These judges will hardly have time to learn anything more than the mere basics of Community 
law. This is also due to the fact that many of them were trained in the times when the Community 
law was unknown to law faculties. One cannot imagine such judges dealing with problematic 
questions of interpretation of Community law and applying all the requirements of the CILFIT 
test. It is excluded due to their limited language competence (which is a general problem of the 
CILFIT test – a judge knowing all 11 official languages, and in the future, 21, would have needed 
to have spent all his life learning them, and would not have had time to study law as well). The 
requirement that the judge must be aware of the evolution of Community law at the date of its 
interpretation is also unrealistic, since, as mentioned above, judges in transition countries have 
enough problems following the evolution of their own national orders.
There are two possible scenarios. The first one foresees that judges in the New Member States, 
well  aware  of  their  duties  resulting  from Art.  234  EC and  individuals’  possibility  to  claim 
damages for judicial breaches of Community law, will refer to the Court of Justice every question 
of  Community  law  which  arises  before  them.  This  will  subsequently  give  the  parties  very 
effective means of prolonging national  proceedings,  and questions will  emerge that  are  even 
more dependant on the will of the parties’ advocates and their knowledge of Community law. 
The Court of Justice will be flooded with these questions.
The alternative scenario anticipates that the  CILFIT  test will be misapplied even more, further 
undermining the authority of the Court’s decisions. National judges will only know that a CILFIT 
test exists, but since they see that it cannot function, none of them will really care about it. Then 
the uniformity of Community law will be seriously threatened.
To  conclude,  it  is  submitted  that  when  dealing  with  the  question  of  the  obligation  to  refer 
questions according to Art.  234 EC, the Court should have reconsidered the  CILFIT  test and 
should have given a better solution, also taking into account the New Member States’ courts.
4.2 Towards a European precedent or building of the judicial hierarchy in Europe?
In the Köbler Case the Court of Justice has held:
In any event, an infringement of Community law will be sufficiently serious where the decision [of a 
national court] concerned was made in manifest breach of the case-law of the Court in the matter.69
We may see this statement from two different perspectives. Firstly, the Court gives its case-law a 
sanction – the sanction of liability of a Member State whose court manifestly breached the case-
law in the matter. It is questionable whether we may still consider the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Justice only as a persuasive authority, as, for example, J. Bengoetxea asserts.70 
68 Ibid., p. 11.
69 Köbler, see n. 8, para. 56. It slightly modifies the wording of the Brasserie de Pêcheur/Factortame III, see n. 16, 
para. 57. On any view, a breach of Community law will clearly be sufficiently serious if it has persisted despite a 
judgement finding the infringement in question to be established, or a preliminary ruling or settled case-law of the 
Court on the matter from which it is clear that the conduct in question constituted an infringement.
70 J. Bengoetxea, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE , Oxford, OUP, 1993, p. 69: a decision of the 
Court is not an “ought-source”, it has only valeur d’ orientation, or persuasive authority.
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Connecting this view with the new Member States, the respect for the Court of Justice’s case-law 
seems more problematic. For example, in the Czech Republic we have seen that tensions exist 
between the Constitutional Court and ordinary courts.71 One of the past disputes concerned the 
binding force of Constitutional  Court decisions.  The Supreme Court repeatedly refused to be 
bound by  the  Constitutional  Court’s  ruling  in  the  case  of  an  applicant  who,  because  of  his 
religion, declined to exercise obligatory military service. It was contrary to the Czech Criminal 
Code. After being penalised he was prosecuted again, since he had persisted in his religion and 
denied  the  service  again.  The  Constitutional  Court  applied  the  principle  ne  bis  in  idem  and 
declared the applicant’s  repeated prosecution (which had reached the Czech Supreme Court) 
unconstitutional. Facing the judgement of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court refused it, 
arguing that  “neither the Constitution nor the Constitutional Court Act contains any provision  
towards  general  bindingness  of  the  Constitutional  Court’s  legal  opinion  expressed  in  its  
rulings”.72 Seeing the Supreme Court as a future Community court, it is doubtful whether its 
judges will follow the rulings of the European Court of Justice.
Secondly, we may see the above cited part of the  Köbler  judgement as the Court of Justice’s 
attempt to further build a hierarchy amongst European courts. So far, there is no such hierarchy –
one cannot say, at least formally, that the Court of Justice is a supreme court of the EU, because 
no appeal from national courts exists and national courts remain autonomous. Therefore, it is 
possible (and actually even likely) that a decision of a national court contrary to Community law 
will never reach the Court of Justice.73 But, when allowing claims of damages based on losses 
suffered by such decisions, the Court creates de facto an appeal procedure enabling their review.74 
This is because it  has a “second” chance to give its interpretation in a case dealing with the 
damages claim, which is well illustrated by the Köbler Case itself. The Verwaltungsgerichtshof  
did not refer the question properly and the Court of Justice could not give its interpretation in the 
matter. But, when dealing with the questions of liability raised in another dispute (now heard by 
the Landesgericht), the Court of Justice finally had a word to say about the contested increment 
of Mr Köbler.
One may say that it still depends on the will (or let us say discretion) of a national judge hearing a 
claim for damages whether he or she refers to the Court the question regarding interpretation of 
the conditions of liability in the case. A judge sitting in the  Landesgericht could have equally 
well decided not to refer any question to the Court of Justice. Nevertheless, we have seen that in 
national legal orders liability for judicial breaches poses problems. Thus, it is very likely that a 
national court would rather refer the questions to the Court of Justice, so as to avoid the sensitive 
question of having to judge another judge. The Landesgericht did exactly this in the Köbler Case. 
It is therefore submitted that the referrals regarding the liability of Member States for judicial 
breaches  allow  the  Court  to  control  the  evolution  of  the  interpretation  (and  application)  of 
Community law on a national level.
71 See supra p. 11-12.
72 Decision of the Supreme Court, File No. 2 Tzn 10/96, 9/10/1997. Cited in P. Holländer, Nástin právní filozofie [An 
Outline of the Philosophy of Law], Prague, Všehrd, 2000, p. 46. The reaction of the Czech Constitutional Court may 
be found in its decision called “Binding Force of Constitutional Court Decisions”, III. ÚS. 425/97, available at 
http://www.concourt.cz/angl_verze/doc/3-425-97.html (1.12. 2003).
73 Cohn-Bendit Case, mentioned above (see n. 13).
74 See n. 7a (Komárek 2005), especially p. 13-15.
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5 CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to present some implications posed by the Köbler Case at the time of 
the Enlargement. They will come to light in the forthcoming years when the ten New Member 
States’ courts become Community courts and their national judges face Community law in their 
court rooms. Since these judges are important actors for the acceptance of Community law at a 
national  level,  from  the  Community  perspective  the  judgement  in  the  Köbler  Case seems 
beneficial for enhancing the Court of Justice’s control over the application and interpretation of 
Community law in national legal orders. However, as presented in the paper, the judgement was 
not properly reasoned and has also left many important questions open, thus undermining its 
legitimacy and acceptance by national judges.
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